Sunday, September 27, 2009

The Limits of Cosmopolitan Right

In his third definitive article for perpetual peace, Kant says: "Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality."

The german reads: Das Weltbürgerrecht soll auf Bedingungen der allgemeinen Hospitalität eingeschränkt sein. (Ak 8:357)

Many contemporary political theorists have tried to take cosmopolitan right beyond these "limits". Perhaps it is just my limited knowledge of German, but I'm not sure how limited cosmopolitan right was for Kant. Here's the ambiguity I am thinking of.

It is interesting to me that Kant does not say that cosmopolitan right shall be "limited to universal hospitality" but "limited to conditions [auf Bedingungen] of universal hospitality". Does the right to visit only come into effect under conditions of universal hospitality? That is, is cosmopolitan right limited to conditions of universal hospitality, in that outside of the existence (or possible existence) of these conditions, we cannot think about cosmopolitan right, and it holds no sway?

Note that Gregor's translation refers to "conditions" not the "condition" (singular) of universal hospitality. I am not sure what to make of this. Is that we need everyone to be hospitable? After all, why should I act hospitably if I do not know you will? (Compare to section 8 in the Metaphysics of Morals- Kant discusses possession of private things in the state of nature. He says I am under no obligation to refrain from touching your possessions unless you refrain from touching mine. This follows from a universal and reciprocal rule. However, we can only have a guarantee in the civil condition, where there is common power. But at the cosmopolitan level, there is no world government (at least not yet). So how can I be under an obligation to leave another's possession untouched? Indeed, why can't the locals treat the others with hostility (in the state of nature, Kant discusses how others can be a threat to me even before they behave badly, so why does Kant say in cosmopolitan right that peaceable behavior is sufficient?) It seems that somehow cosmopolitan right, as a level of public right, brings us out of the state of nature. It is often forgot that at each level of public right, including cosmopolitan right, something needs to be promulgated for it to be law. It seems that hospitality is what needs to be promulgated. So how is it to be promulgated? Are there conditions for promulgation or other conditions for reassurance (even enforcement)? It may be that there to be a whole lot of conditions required before cosmopolitan right can be considered public.

So to say that cosmopolitan right is limited to conditions of hospitality pointed to a general issue with the idea of publicity, perhaps. We can consider that cosmopolitan right is
(1) limited, in that it involves no more than a right to visit; 
(2) limited, in that it stretches no further than where conditions of universal hospitality exist, and so we cannot talk about cosmopolitan right as a category of public if there is universal (or general) hospitality; (3) limited, in that it stretches no further than saying that conditions of universal hospitality shall exist, that is the command to allow others to visit peacefully, etc. (to establishing universal hospitality); 
(4) limited to all the measures that might be needed to make it effective, by bringing about the conditions of universal hospitality.
This is a pretty rough division off the top of my head; feedback welcome.

One other matter: I suspect cosmopolitan right has a negative element, in that it mainly says what should not be done. Hospitality is largely defined as not treating anyone with hostility. Kant is limiting what constitutes an authorization to use force. The state of nature includes an authorization to force others to leave it, and to view there not providing you with the security of the state a cause for treating them as an enemy. But cosmopolitan right says I don't get to treat outsiders as an enemy. This differs from the state of nature, which often allows use of force where threats are possible, even before active injury has occurred, simply because they have denied me security (for example, by their very existence in the state of nature). However, in cosmopolitan right, Kant seems to acknowledge that the locals can feel insecure through visitation. indeed, kant points to the horrors of colonialism. BUT, Kant says a possible misuse of the right to visit (by conquering lands!) does not annul the right of the world citizen to travel to seek commerce (Kant may be speaking of the world citizen generally, not necessarily the right of foreigners to actually keep visiting after their misuse to be more than a possibility and has become an active deed).

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2 Comments:

Blogger Gary Banham said...

Really like this posting Tim: you cover a lot of ground and pretty incisive account of limitation here. The negative nature of the 3rd definitive article is what leads to the attempts to extend its province. There is nothing like refugee status included here (despite my previous attempt to read it in). Whilst you tend to focus on indigenous peoples the problem of asylum also needs to be considered and doesn't come under this heading. Where would you put it?

4:55 PM  
Blogger Timothy said...

What in my post convinced you there is nothing like refugee status in cosmopolitan right? The refugee issue is complicated, but I had not meant to say that.

If anything, I meant to support it (partially) through the original possession in common of the Earth. Any state that says "this land is ours" is unilaterally imposing an obligation on others to stay away. What can justify that? Well, there are situations when such turning away cannot possibly be justified. Similar to the logic of the original contract, no one could have consent to unilateral acquisition of territory if it destroys their freedom. The whole purpose of territory and property rights is to allow for freedom. I cannot throw away my humanity by "freely" consenting to a system of property or territory rights that makes freedom impossible. I could not possibly have accepted this.

Hence, I can't turn away a foreigner if this would lead to his destruction. I am saying "this is my land, stay off!" But why does he have a moral duty (of right) to stay away? He is not part of a local original contract; local property rights were not formulated with his interests in mind.

Now, maybe there is no duty to actively assist a refugee. However, it does him impermissible to actively DENY him the conditions of freedom THROUGH imposing a unilateral duty on him (through a supposed law of freedom or right). This is different than furthering the conditions of freedom. For example, Kant does not support sending aid overseas, etc.

One other possibility. Perhaps this is not what you meant, but I have come around a bit to what you said about a person being able to work. Now, I suspect Kant is concerned with political refugees first and foremost. He may allow economic refugees who are desparate, but not those merely seeking a better life. (I.e. People are not owed the best opportunity, but they cannot be denied any opportunities.) But, let's say a person is admitted as a refugee. Then, it may be required to give that person freedom to work, etc. This involves giving them legal capacity.

I am suggesting that a state regulates a certain area of the earth through territorial control. So in some sense, there needs to be a justification of how it controls that. However, this is a gradiated justification in that we owe differerent things to different people. It is not that we owe aid, but that we owe it to them not to deny them space on the earth. More precisely: our own property and rules depend on others being under obligations, and this needs to potentially be justified. I do not think it needs to always be justified to same extent. But it is this manner that I look at things like some things as "compensation" for denial of freedom.

8:06 PM  

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