Kant, the Rechtslehre Game, and the Past
If the transgression is wholly in the past, how compatible is punishment with universal freedom on Kant's account? I thought about this as I was re-reading a passage from Thomas Pogge's "Is Kant's Rechtslehre a 'Comprehensive Liberalism'?" (2002. The main point of Pogge's article is how we can view Kant's political philosophy (as discussed in the Rechtslehre) as able to be a 'freestanding' view (to use Rawls' term) that is potentially separable from Kant's metaphysical views (as discussed, say, in the Critiques). In section C of the introduction to the Rechtslehre, Kant states the universal principle of right [Recht]:
What this suggests to me is that the systematic element of right (Recht) is important, in two ways. First, and more obviously, Kant's right to freedom is concerned with universal freedom. That is, the right to freedom has a social dimension, being concerned with the freedom of everyone insofar as it is compatible with everyone else's. Freedom is not defined in simple individualistic terms. Rather, Kant is concerned about universal freedom.
Second, the conditions of universal freedom include institutionalization. Secure enjoyment of freedom requires enforcement of these rights. So why can't we just say that protecting right involves deterrence, and punishment is a form of deterrence? Well, there is a difference between threatening to punish and actually punishing. Deterrence in the first case is meant to dissuade someone. But "deterrence" in the second case, where the transgression is already committed, cannot refer to deterring the transgressor for that transgression, since the deed is done and in the past. Kant cannot offer a simple utilitarian justification for punishment (he is Kant afterall). Again, it would be a different matter if the effects of it still lasted; it could be unproblematically permissible for the police to use coercion to take back stolen goods. However, if there was just a past tresspassing, can that be punished in the name of right? The solution offered by Pogge (though he does not say he endorses it) is that punishment is a "necessary by-product" a prior attempt at deterrence. It seems that the best case is that deterrence in the first case is permitted, and that a system of threatened punishments to deter is permitted, so as to secure people in their rights. Pogge is suggesting that after such deterrence is unsuccessful, it is permitted to punish. However, the reason, I think, is not simply because it will deter other criminals in the future, or deter this criminal from committed a similar act in the future. Rather, since universal freedom requires secure enjoyment of freedom, and this requires institutionalization, following the rules or principles of the system of right is part of upholding universal freedom. Punishment is done not so much to protect the property of person who suffered the transgression, but rather the entire system of right (which is meant to protect the property of all of us). It is because this entire system of right is justified in the first place (if it is) that the by-product of punishment in cases of unsuccessful deterrence is permitted.
This seems to go back to Rawls' distinction between justification of a practice and justification of applying a rule within that practice. The justification for punishment in individual cases, on the argument I have outlined here, does not appeal at the latter level; it does not say that applying a rule will further some consequence or goal (even if that goal is deterrence). Rather, it suggests that the practice is justified and that punishment (the application of coercion in situations of unsuccessful deterrance) is a byproduct, in the sense that it stems from the general justification of the practice of punishment (or rather, rightful coercion in general). To make this more explicit: threats of punishment are coercion, but are justified because they are a hinderance to a hinderance to freedom. However, the problem seems to be that once the transgression occurs, enforcing the threats no longer seems to hinder anything. So it is hard to see how it can be justified. But on this account, it is justified because it is a byproduct of the initial attempt at deterrence. This is a rough account, I suppose, and I will try to explain in a future post why I think this is idea could have interesting implications for reparations.
"Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law" (Gregor p. 387, Ak 6:230 MM).Kant's principle is an abstract one; it seems to say that anyone is free to do that which does not impinge on anyone else's freedom. What happens if someone does do something wrong (i.e. something incompatible with the universal freedom of everyone)? In section D, Kant then goes on to say that (strict) right is connected to an authorization to use coercion; if someone does something wrong, then it is permissible to use coercion against this coercion. Such coercion is just a hinderance to a hinderance of freedom. As such, such coercion in response to wrong is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws. But how are Kant's ideas in section C and D connected? How does the idea of a universal principle of right lead to the idea (if it does) that right connected to an authorization to use freedom? In this article, Pogge has the illuminating view that we can conceive of Kant's Rechtslehre as a sort of game, where moves are either juridically permissible or impermissible (145). Pogge says:
[C]oercive moves are permissible (right) if and only if any moves they obstruct are impermissible (wrong)... it cannot be impermissible to obstruct an impermissible move, because any such restriction would be redundant; Recht excludes any conditions that make no contribution to the maintenance of mutually secure domains of external freedom." (145)In a footnote, Pogge adds the following:
One might comment that it is indeed relatively straightforward to get from Kant's concept of Recht to the permission to use coercion against impermissible conduct if such coercion is a matter of preventing a transgression at the border (blocking someone's path into another's domain) or a matter of terminating a transgression (ejecting someone from another's domain). The connection is harder to make when it is a matter of punishing someone who is well within her own domain for a transgression that is now wholly in the past. One might try to argue that such punishment is permissible because it is a necessary by-product of a permissible prior (unsuccessful) attempt at deterrence. (145 fn 26, my emphasis)This is an interesting claim to me given my interest in the connection between the past and justice. The problem here is not simply the general problem of whether punishment can be justified in cases of unsuccessful deterrence. The question is about this problem is connection with Kant's views about coercion being justified when it is a hinderance to a hinderance to freedom. Secure domains of freedom are required for Kant's political theory. If I stop you from entering my property by using coercion, I am hindering a hinderance to freedom. Additionally, if I eject you from my house when you are now inside of it, I am using coercion against you, but in a permissible manner as I stop an ongoing hinderance to my freedom (my use of a secure domain of freedom where others cannot legitimately interfere). However, the question Pogge is asking is whether coercion can be used after the transgression is over with. What is the former tresspasser is no longer on the property? What freedom is now being hindered, such that coercion (punishment) against the tresspassers can be seen as a hinderance to a hinderance to freedom?
What this suggests to me is that the systematic element of right (Recht) is important, in two ways. First, and more obviously, Kant's right to freedom is concerned with universal freedom. That is, the right to freedom has a social dimension, being concerned with the freedom of everyone insofar as it is compatible with everyone else's. Freedom is not defined in simple individualistic terms. Rather, Kant is concerned about universal freedom.
Second, the conditions of universal freedom include institutionalization. Secure enjoyment of freedom requires enforcement of these rights. So why can't we just say that protecting right involves deterrence, and punishment is a form of deterrence? Well, there is a difference between threatening to punish and actually punishing. Deterrence in the first case is meant to dissuade someone. But "deterrence" in the second case, where the transgression is already committed, cannot refer to deterring the transgressor for that transgression, since the deed is done and in the past. Kant cannot offer a simple utilitarian justification for punishment (he is Kant afterall). Again, it would be a different matter if the effects of it still lasted; it could be unproblematically permissible for the police to use coercion to take back stolen goods. However, if there was just a past tresspassing, can that be punished in the name of right? The solution offered by Pogge (though he does not say he endorses it) is that punishment is a "necessary by-product" a prior attempt at deterrence. It seems that the best case is that deterrence in the first case is permitted, and that a system of threatened punishments to deter is permitted, so as to secure people in their rights. Pogge is suggesting that after such deterrence is unsuccessful, it is permitted to punish. However, the reason, I think, is not simply because it will deter other criminals in the future, or deter this criminal from committed a similar act in the future. Rather, since universal freedom requires secure enjoyment of freedom, and this requires institutionalization, following the rules or principles of the system of right is part of upholding universal freedom. Punishment is done not so much to protect the property of person who suffered the transgression, but rather the entire system of right (which is meant to protect the property of all of us). It is because this entire system of right is justified in the first place (if it is) that the by-product of punishment in cases of unsuccessful deterrence is permitted.
This seems to go back to Rawls' distinction between justification of a practice and justification of applying a rule within that practice. The justification for punishment in individual cases, on the argument I have outlined here, does not appeal at the latter level; it does not say that applying a rule will further some consequence or goal (even if that goal is deterrence). Rather, it suggests that the practice is justified and that punishment (the application of coercion in situations of unsuccessful deterrance) is a byproduct, in the sense that it stems from the general justification of the practice of punishment (or rather, rightful coercion in general). To make this more explicit: threats of punishment are coercion, but are justified because they are a hinderance to a hinderance to freedom. However, the problem seems to be that once the transgression occurs, enforcing the threats no longer seems to hinder anything. So it is hard to see how it can be justified. But on this account, it is justified because it is a byproduct of the initial attempt at deterrence. This is a rough account, I suppose, and I will try to explain in a future post why I think this is idea could have interesting implications for reparations.
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