Hospitality and Happiness
In discussing cosmopolitan right, Kant says that hospitality is a juridical principle, not a philanthropic principle. One thing that Kant obviously wants to forstall is the idea that hospitality is some kind of beneficience bestowed upon the visitor.
However, other authors have spoken how cosmopolitan right is connection between the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue. We might put it like this: hospitality represents people helping to achieve their practical purposes in the world. It is a duty of virtue to promote the happiness of others. One rationale for cosmopolitan right seems similar to this: we should promote the happiness of others by making it possible to pursue their ends all over the earth. But that phrasing it too extensive, and would be a duty of virtue, not right. It does not match what a duty of right conceptually does (a duty of right is meant to concerned with external actions, not ends). Moreover, it does not match the specific contours of cosmopolitan right. Cosmopolitan right includes no demand to make others happy by accepting their offers of commerce. We only have to not treat them with hostility because they have done so. So hospitality does not command we promote the happiness of others by saying we must accept their offer. Indeed, a duty of beneficience might allow discretion in when to promote others happiness.
However, I think it is worth connecting the rationale behind the right of hospitality with the logic behind the duty (of virtue) to promote others' happiness where possible. My strategy is that Kant rules out certain things in his Rechtslehre. Some contracts (such as contracts of concubinage) cannot be enforced. Most dramatically, a contract for slavery is not allowed; it cannot be enforced, because by "freely" consenting to a contract, the person would be throwing away their freedom, and the person would no longer be a free person subject who can be bound. Only force could keep them in line; hence one cannot freely consent to slavery. If a person decides to go back on it later, it not rightful (or right?) to enforce it. In discussing wage labor, Kant also says there can be contracts for letting and hiring, but they cannot be permanent. At most they can be indefinate, and each party may leave (giving notice, which is an interesting caveat). Similarly, there cannot be a lawful contract for concubinage. If a person in the contract decides to leave, the "contract" cannot rightfully be enforced.
Now it may be thought that the concubinage contract is disallowed because it against "nature" or something like that. But a more fundamental reason is that contracts (allowing) for sex give access to the other person's sexual "members". For Kant, a person is a unity, and giving a right to use another's member disrupts their freedom. He even says women can be consumed up in pregancy through death in child birth. (Men, I think he says, can be consumed through being occupied by the women's demands for sex, and becoming exhausted.) I do not think this is simply a redux of traditional natural law.
What is the rationale for not allowing some contracts? It seems any laws enforcing such contracts are inconsistent with a duty connected with an obligation from the right of humanity in one's person. Look back to the first precept of "Ulpian" in the General Division of Duties of Right in the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant give the command: "Be a juridical man [rechtlicher Mensch]".
Now, all this might sounds like an ethical duty. After all, how could this be enforced? Well, it is important that Kant is talking about juridical honor (hence the translation discussion). I do not think this command is about ethics (though it may arise from ethics of from the same considerations, as I hope to show later). Still, what it does mean is that no legitimate public law can bind others in a manner inconsistent with this duty to assert oneself as an end in oneself, juridically speaking. Public law cannot coerce and enforce laws inconsistent with that. So either there can be no global public law that would bind others to not visit different lands, or states (and maybe peoples) can issue no public law that outsiders cannot present themselves for society. That is, asserting oneself as a human being involves or could involve one's freedom to communicate and offer to interact with others; we cannot have given this up gratutiously. Cosmopolitan right is limited to the conditions of universal hospitality because those are conditions we could have possibly given up when the earth was divided into separate states and lands.
I wonder if there are two threads in this post, one about happiness and the other more about the 'be a juridical man' command. However, I think they could tie together in the following way. If you are to be an end in yourself, and not merely a means for others, this means you at the same time set ends of your own. With these ends we find the connection to happiness. Further, this also connects, as I hinted, with the idea of the original ownership of the earth. The earth cannot be divided in such a way that it makes the pursuit of certain ends impossible. More needs to be said about the particular shape of hospitality. However, the reason this is not strictly about virtue is because a duty of virtue with regard to happiness is not a duty to promote your own happiness. Rather, the doctrine of virtue refers to a duty to promote the happiness of others.
One might say: the locals have a duty to promote the happiness of others. But again, that is a duty of virtue. So how does this get to a right of visitor?? My preliminary thought is that the visitor cannot through away his freedom gratitiously, and not allow himself the possibility to set all sorts of ends, without good reason; he cannot be a mere means. This means he has to set his own ends. This means he cannot be expected to respect property and territorial rights if this would lead to his destruction. The point of property rights is to allow people to freely and securely set their ends. But if the property and territorial rights system is set up so that some people are merely expected to obey, and (what is key) are seen as having a moral obligation to obey, then the system of rights asks to much. Indeed, rather than say that those people have a right to not have such a system imposed on them, we should say that they have a duty to assert their worth and not be treated as mere means. If their only role is to be turned away by countries and left to be destroyed, and it is held that this is their juridical duty, this cannot be right.
However, other authors have spoken how cosmopolitan right is connection between the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue. We might put it like this: hospitality represents people helping to achieve their practical purposes in the world. It is a duty of virtue to promote the happiness of others. One rationale for cosmopolitan right seems similar to this: we should promote the happiness of others by making it possible to pursue their ends all over the earth. But that phrasing it too extensive, and would be a duty of virtue, not right. It does not match what a duty of right conceptually does (a duty of right is meant to concerned with external actions, not ends). Moreover, it does not match the specific contours of cosmopolitan right. Cosmopolitan right includes no demand to make others happy by accepting their offers of commerce. We only have to not treat them with hostility because they have done so. So hospitality does not command we promote the happiness of others by saying we must accept their offer. Indeed, a duty of beneficience might allow discretion in when to promote others happiness.
However, I think it is worth connecting the rationale behind the right of hospitality with the logic behind the duty (of virtue) to promote others' happiness where possible. My strategy is that Kant rules out certain things in his Rechtslehre. Some contracts (such as contracts of concubinage) cannot be enforced. Most dramatically, a contract for slavery is not allowed; it cannot be enforced, because by "freely" consenting to a contract, the person would be throwing away their freedom, and the person would no longer be a free person subject who can be bound. Only force could keep them in line; hence one cannot freely consent to slavery. If a person decides to go back on it later, it not rightful (or right?) to enforce it. In discussing wage labor, Kant also says there can be contracts for letting and hiring, but they cannot be permanent. At most they can be indefinate, and each party may leave (giving notice, which is an interesting caveat). Similarly, there cannot be a lawful contract for concubinage. If a person in the contract decides to leave, the "contract" cannot rightfully be enforced.
Now it may be thought that the concubinage contract is disallowed because it against "nature" or something like that. But a more fundamental reason is that contracts (allowing) for sex give access to the other person's sexual "members". For Kant, a person is a unity, and giving a right to use another's member disrupts their freedom. He even says women can be consumed up in pregancy through death in child birth. (Men, I think he says, can be consumed through being occupied by the women's demands for sex, and becoming exhausted.) I do not think this is simply a redux of traditional natural law.
What is the rationale for not allowing some contracts? It seems any laws enforcing such contracts are inconsistent with a duty connected with an obligation from the right of humanity in one's person. Look back to the first precept of "Ulpian" in the General Division of Duties of Right in the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant give the command: "Be a juridical man [rechtlicher Mensch]".
1) Be a juridical [rechtlicher] human being (honeste vive). Juridical honor [Die rechtliche Ehrbarkeit] (honestas iuridica) consists in asserting [behaupten] one's worth as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying, "Do not make your self a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them." This duty will be explained later as obligation from the right of humanity in our own person (Lex iustitiae). (6:237 MM, Gregor trans. altered)Gregor's translation of rechtlicher Mensch as "honorable man" obscures the connection to Die rechtliche Ehrbarkeit (which Gregor translates as "rightful honor"; I takes the suggestion of Thomas Pogge (2002) instead). The exact translation does not matter so much, so long as we remember the connection to right. So what does it mean to 'be a juridical man' (or, if we prefer, to be an honorable man in the sense dealing with right)? Kant says that juridical honor consists in "asserting" (behaupten) one's worth as a human being. In mentioning this duty, Kant talks about the phrase: Do not make yourself into a mere means for others, but be at the same time an end. The right of humanity in our person means that we cannot treat ourselves in certain ways; we have an obligation not to do so. So we cannot let others treat us as mere means either.
1) Sei ein rechtlicher Mensch ( honeste vive ). Die rechtliche Ehrbarkeit ( honestas iuridica ) besteht darin: im Verhältniß zu Anderen seinen Werth als den eines Menschen zu behaupten, welche Pflicht durch den Satz ausgedrückt wird: "Mache dich anderen nicht zum bloßen Mittel, sondern sei für sie zugleich Zweck." Diese Pflicht wird im folgenden als Verbindlichkeit aus dem Rechte der Menschheit in unserer eigenen Person erklärt werden ( Lex iusti ).
Now, all this might sounds like an ethical duty. After all, how could this be enforced? Well, it is important that Kant is talking about juridical honor (hence the translation discussion). I do not think this command is about ethics (though it may arise from ethics of from the same considerations, as I hope to show later). Still, what it does mean is that no legitimate public law can bind others in a manner inconsistent with this duty to assert oneself as an end in oneself, juridically speaking. Public law cannot coerce and enforce laws inconsistent with that. So either there can be no global public law that would bind others to not visit different lands, or states (and maybe peoples) can issue no public law that outsiders cannot present themselves for society. That is, asserting oneself as a human being involves or could involve one's freedom to communicate and offer to interact with others; we cannot have given this up gratutiously. Cosmopolitan right is limited to the conditions of universal hospitality because those are conditions we could have possibly given up when the earth was divided into separate states and lands.
I wonder if there are two threads in this post, one about happiness and the other more about the 'be a juridical man' command. However, I think they could tie together in the following way. If you are to be an end in yourself, and not merely a means for others, this means you at the same time set ends of your own. With these ends we find the connection to happiness. Further, this also connects, as I hinted, with the idea of the original ownership of the earth. The earth cannot be divided in such a way that it makes the pursuit of certain ends impossible. More needs to be said about the particular shape of hospitality. However, the reason this is not strictly about virtue is because a duty of virtue with regard to happiness is not a duty to promote your own happiness. Rather, the doctrine of virtue refers to a duty to promote the happiness of others.
One might say: the locals have a duty to promote the happiness of others. But again, that is a duty of virtue. So how does this get to a right of visitor?? My preliminary thought is that the visitor cannot through away his freedom gratitiously, and not allow himself the possibility to set all sorts of ends, without good reason; he cannot be a mere means. This means he has to set his own ends. This means he cannot be expected to respect property and territorial rights if this would lead to his destruction. The point of property rights is to allow people to freely and securely set their ends. But if the property and territorial rights system is set up so that some people are merely expected to obey, and (what is key) are seen as having a moral obligation to obey, then the system of rights asks to much. Indeed, rather than say that those people have a right to not have such a system imposed on them, we should say that they have a duty to assert their worth and not be treated as mere means. If their only role is to be turned away by countries and left to be destroyed, and it is held that this is their juridical duty, this cannot be right.
Labels: Kant
posted by Timothy at 2:57 AM
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