Refugees and the Addressees of Cosmopolitan Right

Gary Banham has recently posted on cosmopolitan right, which had me thinking again about the addresses of cosmopolitan right. Who are the "citizens of the world"?

Let's first say what cosmopolitan right is not, by looking at the first two levels of public right. The first level is the right of citizens of a state, (or constitutional right); the focus is on relations between individuals in a local territory and the principles for organizing the constitution of the state. This more or less matches the traditional subject of political theory.

Kant's second level of public right is international right (volkerrecht). In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that international right should more properly be called right between states. Even today we refer to "international law" as if the primary focus was on relations between nations, rather than states. For Kant, nations (or peoples: volker) are not the subject of international right. Indeed, Kant specifically refers to "savages," who "may live near" citizens of a state "in a state of nature," who "do not constitute states by only tribes." (Ak 6:343 MM 53, Gregor p. 483) Kant then says that under the misnamed "right of nations," he is only going to consider "a states, as a moral person... as living in relation to another state in the condition of natural freedom and therefore in a condition of constant war."

Now we come to the third level of public right, cosmopolitan right (weltburgerrecht), or, the right of the world citizen. I said in my first blog post that: cosmopolitan right is a juridical category used by Immanuel Kant to discuss the rational principles for the lawful interaction between individuals, peoples [or nations], and states sharing a bounded earth. Are there really these three categories of citizens of the earth?

Kant says that cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. Gary says that Kant defines hospitality as "the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another" (Ak. 8: 357-8). Foreigners have the right to visit other lands to present themselves for society. However, foreigners can be turned away so long as this does not lead to their destruction (Untergang). This seems to have bearing on talk about the rights of refugees; with respect to this, Gary makes the interesting claim:

At this point it is also interesting that Kant is speaking here of the foreigner presenting themselves before individuals of the state they have arrived in, not of some responsibility of the government.

Gary says here that Kant is not talking about state responsibility for refugees, since foreigners present themselves to individuals. I have some doubts about Gary's claim, which bear on my question of who are the addressees of cosmopolitan right; hence, analyzing Gary's claim is relevant for how to characterize the citizens of the world.

First, do foreign individuals only present themselves to local individuals, and not states? Kant speaks of the foreigner arriving on the "land of another," which is generic. But just because Kant is or could be discussing individual-individual relations, does not mean he is not discussing individual-state relations. The right of the world citizen is the right not to treated with hostility, simply because he is visiting. I think the key question is whether states, as well as individuals, can treat foreigners in a hostile manner. And I think the answer is yes.

Second, I don't think we exhaust the possibilities by thinking only of individual-individual relations or individual-state relations. What about relations between an foreign individual and a people? That is, with a people, regardless of, or in abstraction from, whether they make up a civil state? Remember, from our above discussion of international right, not all peoples constitute states. Non-state peoples have a society, but their society is not organized according to principles of constitutional right (they are not "civilized"). Kant certainly thinks such peoples act inhospitably when they regard approach as an entitlement to plunder. If a tribe descends on a visitor, the visitor not just treated inhospitably by individuals, is he?

Third, Kant says there is no right to be treat as a guest of the household. This seems different than talking about individuals. It could be said that for Kant, there is the right of the head of the household (see his section on the right of domestic society in private right in MM and also section 41). Note that Kant says the individual is presenting himself for society. Kant says that even in the state of nature, there can be societies compatible with rights (section 41). When Kant talks about non-sedentary peoples in cosmopolitan right (who he does not think constitute states), is he talking about these societies?

While Gary says Kant is missing (at least at first) discussions of governments, I think Kant is not discussing states so as to also capture relations with non-state peoples. There does seem to be an issue with Kant not considering a cosmopolitan government under cosmopolitan right, but I don't think this is because he does (or must) exclude consideration of local governments. I do think Kant abstracts from whether peoples constitute states, and governments in his sense (being a "civil" state); but I am not sure whether Kant excludes a society (be it a civilized one or not) collectively aiding refugees.

Actually, I am not sure I want to put this in terms of aiding refugees, as if it were some sort of active duty. Suppose a shipwrecked crew arrives on my land. Kant says that an individual local cannot turn them away if this would cause their destruction. But does the local individual have to do more than not turn them away? Can it leave them to wander and find their own food? Or do the locals (in thanksgiving style) have to actively provide hospitality by giving provisions (at least until the ship is repaired)? The problem is same even if we consider the society as a whole or the state (remember also: for Kant, the Mongolian people could collectively own their land, so collective ownership, and hence exclusive from what is collectively owned, is a possible way outsiders might be treated inhospitably).

I think there is a reason Kant focuses the right to hospitality on the idea that all humans originally possessed the earth in common, and that originally no one had a right to any particular place. A local individual (or society, or state -- it does not matter) cannot unilaterally claim a portion of what was originally possessed in common, claim that all others are unilaterally put under a duty not to use this land, and thereby cause the destruction of those other foreigners (by right!). I think that the issue is not so much about needs per se, but about denying the conditions of freedom for others. These often coincide. However, the duty of hospitality does not seem to require sending food to starving others overseas who never travel to one's local lands. So I'm not sure it requires active provision to those who arrive -- as a basic duty-- though active provision may be required as compensation for another freedom denied, such as if you unilaterally enforce your property rights, rather than letting the foreigners help themselves to your food. (This is like Locke's duty of charity in the First Treatise.)