Non-state peoples and indirect duties

In cosmopolitan right, Kant describes a right of the world citizen to visit foreign lands, and make offers for further dealings, without being treating with hostility by others (the locals) for having made this attempt. Kant *does not directly* say there is a right of the local people not be conquered or have their land settled on without their permission. Many authors seem to think he does, since Kant condemns such behavior by Europeans. He also describes such behavior as inhospitable, which makes it sound like the Native peoples have a right of hospitality. I am not convinced this is true. Many writers act as if Kant thought that Kant spoke about indigenous rights, and further that they did this was because of some respect owed.. You might ask: but if Europeans have a duty not to act inhospitably, doesn't this mean indigenous peoples have rights? Well, perhaps, but only in a derivative sense. The right of indigenous peoples, or any possible basis behind those rights, are not (or may not be- it's unclear) what grounds those duties. Remember, Kant talks about direct and indirect duties. For Kant, humans can have indirect duties to animals, because humans also have an animal nature, and being violent wantonly to animals would be to disrespect our animal nature. I am not saying Kant thought indigenous peoples were like animals or beasts. Quite the contrary. The form of the argument is similar however. States respect each other internationally because of their moral personality, which they have because they are civil states. This is discussed in international right. However, international right does not discuss how states and the people in them can have a good beyond being a state of civil right. They freely choose their own ends, a mark of humanity. (These ends may not be in accord with the moral law, which is what realized moral personality is about.) Even if a social group does not form a civil society (has no moral personhood as a civil society), it has formed a society with a way of life, and has done this through setting its ends freely, through concepts of happiness of how they want to live. For Kant in domestic society, I generally cannot interfere with your pursuit of happiness if you do not violate (my) rights. Cosmopolitically, I cannot interfere with another society, even if it does not accord with a state of civil right; such people do not wrong those outside of the society (at least if they are not powerful enough to invade others). So states can respect non-state peoples because of their common humanity, which consists in freedom in the way they live and reside on the earth. Even civil societies pursue material ends (such as trade) and cosmopolitan right deals with the pursuit of such non-moral (though not necessarily immoral) ends. Interestingly, cosmopolitan right can be seen as the conditions that do not make impossible people seeking happiness across the earth, but that is for another time. 

Thee forms of Autonomy

I am reading Paul Guyer's Kant.  Guyer mentions how in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant says that "each of three main cognitive powers - theoretical understanding practical reason, and the power of judgment - can be understood as a form of authonomy" (Guyer's words, p 5; cf. V:196)

I was wondering if each of these powers somehow coincided with the three "authorities" in the state, the legislative authority, the executive authority, and the judicial authority. Or whether the three critiques coincided with the three definitive articles of perpetual peace. Interestingly, we might see cosmopolitan right as about judgment. In the third critique, Kant says that by looking at nature's organization, we can (according to Guyer) see that "nature is hospitable [!] to our most general cognitive and practical objectives." (Guyer, p. 6) I wonder if this maps on to the right to hospitality, in that cosmopolitan right means the ordering of the earth so it is hospitable our cognitive and practical objectives (such as exchanging ideas and goods). Of course, I can't read too much into Guyer's words, but it does make me wonder what is meant by hospitality (and what would be required to make the globe hospitable for our objectives).

Why does The Right of the State Lead to The Right of Nations?

Kant says that the right of the state (constitutional right within a state) leads inevitably to idea of the right of nations and to the idea of the right of all nations or the idea of cosmopolitan right. Why is this? I briefly explored this in a previous post, which I have significantly expanded and revised.

The category of cosmopolitan right (vs. content)

When discussing the limits of cosmopolitan right, and the possible need to take it further today, it is important to separate discussions on the limits of the category versus limits on the content of the right of hospitality.

How does Kant characterizes the juridical category of cosmopolitan right? What is the subject matter of cosmopolitan right? Cosmopolitan right is about the principles for interactions between individuals and peoples and between peoples and peoples, given we share a limited globe. On this I largely follow Jeremy Waldron (though not his more substantive conclusions about what accepting this characterization entails). I do not think it is simply about the human rights all persons have or should have; in this I disagree with the restricted focus on individuals' relations to states found in the work of Seyla Benhabib and some others who use cosmopolitan right. This seems to me to restricted or limited definition of cosmopolitan right. Benhabib expands the content of the right of hospitality beyond temporary sojourn, to arguments for a right to obtain membership, so in this sense her use of cosmopolitan right is less limited that Kant's. But this is mainly in terms of the content, not the premises of the category.

Cosmopolitan has (or can be seen as having) some interesting facets that are relevent for examining issues of colonization. These are not just relation between individuals within a state, but relations between peoples. Waldron himself has noted that colonization is an issue that could be discussed in cosmopolitan right, though he mainly uses the category of cosomopolitan right to argue for its irrelevance in a certain sense: we are now unavoidably side by side not only by sharing a globe, but in sharing a local territory; even if we got here by injustice, we now have to come to terms with each other; Waldron argues that this should be in the terms of positive law basically in the context of somethng like the category of Kant's (domestic) constitutional right.

It also seems to me that Habermas (at least until recently) has perhaps misused the term cosmopolitan right. I think Habermas is now trying to expand international right (at least, this is what I think on reading part of the Divided West). The limits of cosmopolitan right become a synonym for issues about the world state and enforceable international law. I do not think that is the whole picture. It is useful to think of "citizens of the world" as more than states, but also concerning peoples and individuals.

Two Classics from Monty Python

Two Monty Python classics: The Philosophers Drinking Song and the Philosophers' World Cup.
Update: Here is a link to a video of the drinking song with the lyrics as well.

Plato's Claymation

Plato's Allegory of the Cave, in claymation. (via Brooks Blog)

On Blogging and Comments

I really like blogging, which is probably why I gave it up 5 years ago to work on my dissertation. The virtue of blogging is that I can write on ideas without feeling they need be finished. It is helping me to organization my thoughts in more bite size chunks. On the other hand, what if my posting ideas here leads me not being able to publish an article, or to someone taking ideas? That's a possible downside. I'm hoping for some comments to get some feedback (they should work now). But even if no one is reading, at least it will be good for me to post thoughts (I hope!)

The Limits of Cosmopolitan Right

In his third definitive article for perpetual peace, Kant says: "Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality."

The german reads: Das Weltbürgerrecht soll auf Bedingungen der allgemeinen Hospitalität eingeschränkt sein. (Ak 8:357)

Many contemporary political theorists have tried to take cosmopolitan right beyond these "limits". Perhaps it is just my limited knowledge of German, but I'm not sure how limited cosmopolitan right was for Kant. Here's the ambiguity I am thinking of.

It is interesting to me that Kant does not say that cosmopolitan right shall be "limited to universal hospitality" but "limited to conditions [auf Bedingungen] of universal hospitality". Does the right to visit only come into effect under conditions of universal hospitality? That is, is cosmopolitan right limited to conditions of universal hospitality, in that outside of the existence (or possible existence) of these conditions, we cannot think about cosmopolitan right, and it holds no sway?

Note that Gregor's translation refers to "conditions" not the "condition" (singular) of universal hospitality. I am not sure what to make of this. Is that we need everyone to be hospitable? After all, why should I act hospitably if I do not know you will? (Compare to section 8 in the Metaphysics of Morals- Kant discusses possession of private things in the state of nature. He says I am under no obligation to refrain from touching your possessions unless you refrain from touching mine. This follows from a universal and reciprocal rule. However, we can only have a guarantee in the civil condition, where there is common power. But at the cosmopolitan level, there is no world government (at least not yet). So how can I be under an obligation to leave another's possession untouched? Indeed, why can't the locals treat the others with hostility (in the state of nature, Kant discusses how others can be a threat to me even before they behave badly, so why does Kant say in cosmopolitan right that peaceable behavior is sufficient?) It seems that somehow cosmopolitan right, as a level of public right, brings us out of the state of nature. It is often forgot that at each level of public right, including cosmopolitan right, something needs to be promulgated for it to be law. It seems that hospitality is what needs to be promulgated. So how is it to be promulgated? Are there conditions for promulgation or other conditions for reassurance (even enforcement)? It may be that there to be a whole lot of conditions required before cosmopolitan right can be considered public.

So to say that cosmopolitan right is limited to conditions of hospitality pointed to a general issue with the idea of publicity, perhaps. We can consider that cosmopolitan right is

(1) limited, in that it involves no more than a right to visit; 

(2) limited, in that it stretches no further than where conditions of universal hospitality exist, and so we cannot talk about cosmopolitan right as a category of public if there is universal (or general) hospitality; (3) limited, in that it stretches no further than saying that conditions of universal hospitality shall exist, that is the command to allow others to visit peacefully, etc. (to establishing universal hospitality); 

(4) limited to all the measures that might be needed to make it effective, by bringing about the conditions of universal hospitality.

This is a pretty rough division off the top of my head; feedback welcome.

One other matter: I suspect cosmopolitan right has a negative element, in that it mainly says what should not be done. Hospitality is largely defined as not treating anyone with hostility. Kant is limiting what constitutes an authorization to use force. The state of nature includes an authorization to force others to leave it, and to view there not providing you with the security of the state a cause for treating them as an enemy. But cosmopolitan right says I don't get to treat outsiders as an enemy. This differs from the state of nature, which often allows use of force where threats are possible, even before active injury has occurred, simply because they have denied me security (for example, by their very existence in the state of nature). However, in cosmopolitan right, Kant seems to acknowledge that the locals can feel insecure through visitation. indeed, kant points to the horrors of colonialism. BUT, Kant says a possible misuse of the right to visit (by conquering lands!) does not annul the right of the world citizen to travel to seek commerce (Kant may be speaking of the world citizen generally, not necessarily the right of foreigners to actually keep visiting after their misuse to be more than a possibility and has become an active deed).

Refugees and the Addressees of Cosmopolitan Right

Gary Banham has recently posted on cosmopolitan right, which had me thinking again about the addresses of cosmopolitan right. Who are the "citizens of the world"?

Let's first say what cosmopolitan right is not, by looking at the first two levels of public right. The first level is the right of citizens of a state, (or constitutional right); the focus is on relations between individuals in a local territory and the principles for organizing the constitution of the state. This more or less matches the traditional subject of political theory.

Kant's second level of public right is international right (volkerrecht). In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that international right should more properly be called right between states. Even today we refer to "international law" as if the primary focus was on relations between nations, rather than states. For Kant, nations (or peoples: volker) are not the subject of international right. Indeed, Kant specifically refers to "savages," who "may live near" citizens of a state "in a state of nature," who "do not constitute states by only tribes." (Ak 6:343 MM 53, Gregor p. 483) Kant then says that under the misnamed "right of nations," he is only going to consider "a states, as a moral person... as living in relation to another state in the condition of natural freedom and therefore in a condition of constant war."

Now we come to the third level of public right, cosmopolitan right (weltburgerrecht), or, the right of the world citizen. I said in my first blog post that: cosmopolitan right is a juridical category used by Immanuel Kant to discuss the rational principles for the lawful interaction between individuals, peoples [or nations], and states sharing a bounded earth. Are there really these three categories of citizens of the earth?

Kant says that cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. Gary says that Kant defines hospitality as "the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another" (Ak. 8: 357-8). Foreigners have the right to visit other lands to present themselves for society. However, foreigners can be turned away so long as this does not lead to their destruction (Untergang). This seems to have bearing on talk about the rights of refugees; with respect to this, Gary makes the interesting claim:

At this point it is also interesting that Kant is speaking here of the foreigner presenting themselves before individuals of the state they have arrived in, not of some responsibility of the government.

Gary says here that Kant is not talking about state responsibility for refugees, since foreigners present themselves to individuals. I have some doubts about Gary's claim, which bear on my question of who are the addressees of cosmopolitan right; hence, analyzing Gary's claim is relevant for how to characterize the citizens of the world.

First, do foreign individuals only present themselves to local individuals, and not states? Kant speaks of the foreigner arriving on the "land of another," which is generic. But just because Kant is or could be discussing individual-individual relations, does not mean he is not discussing individual-state relations. The right of the world citizen is the right not to treated with hostility, simply because he is visiting. I think the key question is whether states, as well as individuals, can treat foreigners in a hostile manner. And I think the answer is yes.

Second, I don't think we exhaust the possibilities by thinking only of individual-individual relations or individual-state relations. What about relations between an foreign individual and a people? That is, with a people, regardless of, or in abstraction from, whether they make up a civil state? Remember, from our above discussion of international right, not all peoples constitute states. Non-state peoples have a society, but their society is not organized according to principles of constitutional right (they are not "civilized"). Kant certainly thinks such peoples act inhospitably when they regard approach as an entitlement to plunder. If a tribe descends on a visitor, the visitor not just treated inhospitably by individuals, is he?

Third, Kant says there is no right to be treat as a guest of the household. This seems different than talking about individuals. It could be said that for Kant, there is the right of the head of the household (see his section on the right of domestic society in private right in MM and also section 41). Note that Kant says the individual is presenting himself for society. Kant says that even in the state of nature, there can be societies compatible with rights (section 41). When Kant talks about non-sedentary peoples in cosmopolitan right (who he does not think constitute states), is he talking about these societies?

While Gary says Kant is missing (at least at first) discussions of governments, I think Kant is not discussing states so as to also capture relations with non-state peoples. There does seem to be an issue with Kant not considering a cosmopolitan government under cosmopolitan right, but I don't think this is because he does (or must) exclude consideration of local governments. I do think Kant abstracts from whether peoples constitute states, and governments in his sense (being a "civil" state); but I am not sure whether Kant excludes a society (be it a civilized one or not) collectively aiding refugees.

Actually, I am not sure I want to put this in terms of aiding refugees, as if it were some sort of active duty. Suppose a shipwrecked crew arrives on my land. Kant says that an individual local cannot turn them away if this would cause their destruction. But does the local individual have to do more than not turn them away? Can it leave them to wander and find their own food? Or do the locals (in thanksgiving style) have to actively provide hospitality by giving provisions (at least until the ship is repaired)? The problem is same even if we consider the society as a whole or the state (remember also: for Kant, the Mongolian people could collectively own their land, so collective ownership, and hence exclusive from what is collectively owned, is a possible way outsiders might be treated inhospitably).

I think there is a reason Kant focuses the right to hospitality on the idea that all humans originally possessed the earth in common, and that originally no one had a right to any particular place. A local individual (or society, or state -- it does not matter) cannot unilaterally claim a portion of what was originally possessed in common, claim that all others are unilaterally put under a duty not to use this land, and thereby cause the destruction of those other foreigners (by right!). I think that the issue is not so much about needs per se, but about denying the conditions of freedom for others. These often coincide. However, the duty of hospitality does not seem to require sending food to starving others overseas who never travel to one's local lands. So I'm not sure it requires active provision to those who arrive -- as a basic duty-- though active provision may be required as compensation for another freedom denied, such as if you unilaterally enforce your property rights, rather than letting the foreigners help themselves to your food. (This is like Locke's duty of charity in the First Treatise.)

Columbia Conference on War and the Modern Classics (plus super-squirrels)

I spent last weekend in New York attending a conference on: The modern classics and the ethics of war. There were paper presentations by Jennifer Pitts, Richard Tuck, Michael Doyle and many others. "The modern classics" refers to, I suppose, writers from the 16th to 19th century, such as Vitoria, Grotius, Woolf, Kant, Hegel, Mazzini, and Mill. The thrust of the conference was on what we might learn from these political theorists, jurists, and writers today when thinking about the ethics of war. Not surprising, issues of humanitarian intervention came up a great deal. One of the more interesting claims was that Mazzini was the first to articulate the idea of *separate* democratic peace. In contemporary international relations scholarship, the idea of the "democratic peace" has shown that democracies tend not to fight each other. This is different from earlier writers such as Kant, who said that democracies (or republics) are less likely to go war with any regime. It is important not to squirrel away this caveat. Mazzini apparently suggested the idea of separate democratic peace, that is, a peace among democracies. This was brought out by a presentation by Stefano Recchia, the organizer of the conference, whom I knew from my previous time as a graduate student at Columbia University, before coming to Queen's University.


On Squirrels: I am losing the war with squirrels in Kingston. They had previously managed to chew through the screen windows three times and make off with bread. New animal proof windows were installed a month or two ago. But today, I woke up to find a small hole chewed, and entire screen window pushed open. These truly are super-squirrels.

Inheritance, International Right and Kant (revised)

(This is much revised and enlarged version of my earlier post on the the right of nations and inheritance.)

Kant says that the right of the state (constitutional right within a state) leads inevitably to idea of the right of nations and to the idea of the right of all nations or the idea of cosmopolitan right. Kant suggests that if the principles of outer freedom falter in one area of public right, this puts the overall framework of right in danger. Why does the idea of the right of the state inevitably lead to the ideas of the other two? Or, why does the general idea of public right necessarily involve all three categories of public right?

(Kant says that this is so most directly in section 43 of the Metaphysics of Morals, but he also says something like this in first footnote to section II in Perpetual Peace)

One possible answer is that troubles abroad threaten security and liberties at home, and a state cannot maintain a democratic/republican constitution easily if it has hostile neighbors. The right of state demands a republican constitution. However, Kant says in perpetual peace that a ruler may delay the implementation of a republican constitution domestically if it is has enemies and requires a constitution that is prepared for war. This is a permissive law of sorts, that allows the ruler to delay reform until the time is right. And the time may only be right under conditions of peace with other nations, hence the need for international right. However, this seems to more about laws or nature than about right. It depends on a chain of mediated causation: the conditions requiring the immediate implementation of a republican constitution are not operative if there are foreign threats. The connection between the right of a state internally and international right is indirect, and mediated by empirical circumstances of a certain sort. I think there are other arguments in Kant's work based more directly on concepts of right.

Interesting, Kant says while a state is a commonwealth to its people, it appears as a power ("Macht") to others. Perhaps Kant is suggesting that for their assertion of power to be lawful, it will need to be more than just mere power. Legitimate coercion needs to be built on a common interest. For citizens of one state, they are subject to coercion through a common interest in being in a condition of right. (Their common interest is not their happiness per se; one cannot be coerced simply for their happiness.) Why they are coerced by their state, this is (or can be) seen as legitimate authority, in according with the original contract. State power over citizens is not merely might or power ("Macht"). Otherwise, why would they be bound to obey? In the introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says I can be subject to laws only that I will; I must will these law either by myself or along with others. If the ruler wills something that the citizens of the state could not possibly have agreed to, then this fails the tests of legitimacy present in the idea of the original contract, whereby all citizens give up their lawless freedom for civil freedom, civil equality, and equal dependence on a common law. The original contract gives conditions for what can possibly constitute a common law.  (Note: Kant does not assume that a historical contract ever existed. The original contract is merely an idea of reason to test the legitimacy of laws. Also, the test of legitimacy refers not to how citizens might judge a matter now if asked , but to what they could possibly have consented to, if we conceive them as free and equal parties.)

Why do citizens care about how outsiders see them?  Perhaps citizens of one state cannot be secure in the enjoyment of their rights, if outsiders see it merely as a power. If different states do not exist in relations of right, there is state of war between them (whether or not there are active hostilities).

More strongly, their rights domestically are protected by the idea of right. If the ruler of the state renounces allegiance to right internationally, especially if on the basis of power, how can citizens be sure rulers will not assert their right to rule simply on the basis of power as well? There's all sorts of possible questions about what powers any state may have, given that outsiders are excluded.  (This could also apply to cosmopolitan right.)

However, we can go further. I would like to suggest an even stronger reason connecting the right of the state to international right and the right of all nations, or cosmopolitan right. This has to do with Kant's notion of inheritance.

Inheritance

In section 43 of the Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant says a state is called a power ("Macht") in its relations to other peoples, Kant also says that a state is also called a nation [stammvolk], because their union of members is presumably an inherited union. Here is the quote in English and German:

"In relation to other peoples, however, a state is called simply a power [Macht] (potentia) (hence the word potentate). Because the union of members is (presumed to be [anmaßlich]) one they inherited [angeerbter], a state is also called a nation [Stammvolk]  (gens). Hence, under the general concept of public right we are led to think not only of the right of a state but also of a right of nations (ius gentium)." (Gregor, p. 455)

"...in Verhältniß aber auf andere Völker eine Macht ( potentia ) schlechthin heißt (daher das Wort Potentaten), was sich auch wegen (anmaßlich) angeerbter Vereinigung ein Stammvolk ( gens ) nennt und so unter dem allgemeinen Begriffe des öffentlichen Rechts nicht bloß das Staats=, sondern auch ein Völkerrecht ( ius gentium ) zu denken Anla giebt..." (6:312 MM 43

It might be that Kant is just giving a reason why we have different names. But I want to pick up on the reference to the reference to an inherited union (angeerbter Vereinigung) being called a Stammvolk. However, why not just use the word "volk"? That would adequately translate people or nation. So it is worth discussing the meaning of Stammvolk, as it might suggest an original or aboriginal nation, as if the union had always existed.

Note: I am not saying Kant has an ethnic conception of the nation; it is a rather political conception of volk; the word volk had not acquired all the connotations in German it later would. Also, I am not suggesting he is thinking of "aboriginal peoples" as a type of cultural grouping; I am just suggested that the use of stammvolk rather than volk suggested that the union is presumed to stretched back to the depths of time. The civil union is presumed to aboriginal. What this means is that there is an implicit claim that the people of the land were the first or earliest to form a civil union there, and that contemporaries have inherited this civil union. This might form a basis for outsiders  to respect it as more than just a power.

I speculate Kant might have made a connection between inheritance and the right of states in relations to other states. Why, after all, does a present generation of fellow citizens have a right to the territory the state resides on, the fruits of previous economic and political actions, and the right to determine the country's future? Why do those born in the U.S. have a right to access this wealthy economic and political system? If he American civil union is (presumed to be) one they inherited, then we might use Kant's analysis of inheritance to think about global justice. I say more on the specifics of contemporary problems later. For now, I want to turn to what Kant says about inheritance.

Before discussing public right, Kant says how we might acquire possessory rights according to natural right. This is the section on private right, before Kant specifically discusses anything to do with nations or states. Most of the time, Kant is discusses how possessory rights of some sort can be acquired in the state of nature, according to natural right. However, sometimes Kant discusses natural law in private right with reference to future laws in the civil condition. This is so with inheritance.

In his discussion of private right in section 34 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant first talks about inheritance. He says that there is a natural law regarding inheritance, but this only means that we can tell from reason that a law about inheritance is fit for introduction into the civil condition. This does not mean we have a right of inheritance outside the civil condition. Kant notes that there is no right to an estate left to a person in a will until the bequester dies, because the person could always change his will. However, after the person dies, how is the property to be transferred? You cannot assume that the person would accept it. So, there is that moment when it seems that no one owns it, or at least that it is vacant. Something needs to fill that moment  (Otherwise, why is the estate not open to first taker?) Kant says the general will in civil condition fills that moment. It tells others to stay away from the estate; only one has the right to (choose to) inherit. Kant is showing how others can be bound to respect my right with regard to inheritance.

I haven't spelled out all the details precisely, but summary, these are the three important ones are: (1) the acquisition is ideal, as acquisition is from someone who no longer exists; what is acquired is not all the things left, but the right to choose whether to accept the legacy and everything with it, (2) there is moment where the legacy hovers, after the death of the person and before the legacy is accepted or repudiated by the hier, (3) the right to inherit can exist (be effective) only in the civil condition. (Though, again, he thinks natural right can tell us that this right is fit for introduction in the civil condition.)

The basic idea I have is this: if another state is seen merely as a power, it seems outsiders only have to respect it as much as prudence requires. However, if the civil union is one they have inherited, then other states can respect this inheritance, if there is a condition of public right. If inheritance can only exist in the civil condition, and states vis-a-vis each other are not in the civil condition, then how does each generation inherit the previous political community, claiming to have a special responsibility to look after its interests?  International right is the condition of right under which other are to respect to the moral personality of one state, and their inherited civil union (since moral personality is through time). So the right of the state requires international right.

Indeed, in section 53 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant begins his discussion of the right of nations by by saying:

As natives of a country, those who constitute a nation [volk] can be looked upon analogously to descendants of the same ancestors [Elterstamm] (congeniti) even though they are not. Yet in an intellectual sense and from the perspective of rights, since they are born of the same mother (the republic) they constitute as it were one family (gens natio), whose members (citizens of the state) are of equally high birth and do not mix with those who may live near them in a state of nature..." (6:343 MM 53, Gregor p. 382)

Die Menschen, welche ein Volk ausmachen, können als Landeseingeborne nach der Analogie der Erzeugung von einem gemeinschaftlichen Elterstamm ( congeniti ) vorgestellt werden, ob sie es gleich nicht sind: dennoch aber in intellectueller und rechtlicher Bedeutung, als von einer gemeinschaftlichen Mutter (der Republik) geboren, gleichsam eine Familie ( gens, natio ) ausmachen, deren Glieder (Staatsbürger) alle ebenbürtig sind und mit denen, die neben ihnen im Naturzustande leben möchten, als unedlen keine Vermischung eingehen...

I am curious about the term "Elterstamm" which Gregors translates as ancestors. I might be making a leap, suggesting it has some connection to Stammvolk.

To address a possible objection: There may be no need for an account of inheritance beyond the state, because states can be assumed to possess their territory just because they now possess it. However, I think it is helpful to consider the importance of the state a moral person, which implies an ongoing civil union (an inherited one).

There is also a passage about inheriting in Theory and Practice that is interesting. Kant writes:

Not a paternalistic but a patriotic government (imperium non paternale, sed patrioticum) is the only one that can be thought for human beings, who are capable of rights, and also with reference to the benevolence of the ruler. In a patriotic way of thinking everyone in a state (its head not excepted) regards the commonwealth as the maternal womb, or the country as the paternal land, from which and on which he has arisen and which he must also leave behind as a cherished pledge, only so as to consider himself authorized to protect its rights by laws of the common will but not to subject the use of it to his unconditional discretion. (8:291 TP II, Gregor 291-92)

Finally, inheritance may be relevant when considering states that have lost their territory, or even their moral personality, temporarily. In this regard, we might look at what Kant says before he mentions inheritance in section 34, and look at the previous section, section 33. This section also discusses a form of ideal acquisition, acquisition by prolonged possession. Kant says that whoever fails to publicly document his possessory claim loses it, if he does not use something for a while. If another possesses something for a while (in good faith), they become the possessor. The most the previous possessor can say was that he was once the true owner. Only in a civil condition can the state represent someone whose possessory act is interrupted, and preserve his right. Otherwise, there could be previous possessors that I would have no idea existed, and who could always possibly show up and deprive me of my property; this would contradict the permissive law of practical reason with regard to rights, the whole point of which is allow people to securely have private possessory rights.

In the second preliminary article, Kant forbids states acquiring states in certain maners. Indeed, he says a state cannot inherit a state because of the nature of the original contract, through which alone one has a right to rule people. However, as I mention, Kant says that the state involved people involved in thinking of themselves as descended from a common ancestor in an intellectual sense. This preserved the idea of moral personality, that the state or people as a whole has a moral personality that should be respected. Indeed, the second preliminary article of perpetual peace requires certain states to be restored (eventually at least) to their former condition as independent states. This means that their status as having an inherited civil union (their moral personality) continues in an intellectual sense. Simply being a "power" would not work, as they do not have the power. However, they can recover their rights, it seems (or rather, their rights should be restored to them). In this respect, Kant's thought on recovery in private right relevant, but that will have to wait until another day.

Permissive Laws: Preliminary Thoughts

Does it make sense to talk about a 'permissive law'? Laws are usually thought to prohibit or command. Kant has some interesting thoughts on the idea of a 'permissive law'. I see that the blog kantemplation is trying to grapple with these issues. Kantemplation seems to speak of one permissive law, but it is not quite clear to me why there should be only one, anymore than there should be one law that commands.

Anyway, so Kant has these strange passages in Perpetual Peace where he says we can delay putting into effect the right constitution in certain circumstances, but we cannot delay it foreover. He also uses the term with reference to sex (in both right and ethics), and most importantly (in my view) in his discussion in section 2 of the metaphysics of morals, where we get the juridical postulate of public reason, and in section 16 of the same, where Kant sees of a need for a permissive law to provide a principle for the limits of possible rightful possession.

So, where does God fit into this? Well, one connection is that Kant elsewhere discusses the postulate of God, whereas here he is discussing the juridicial postulate of practical reason. Maybe the permissive law is like a divine command.

Blogging on Kant, Politics, and Philosophy

"Cosmopolitan Right" is a juridical category used by Immanuel Kant to discuss the rational principles for lawful interaction of individuals, peoples, and states sharing a bounded earth. Kant says that cosmopolitan right is limited to universal hospitality. Specifically, he allows foreigners to visit lands to propose further interaction and commerce without being treated in a hostile manner; however, he balances this with a condemnation of Europeans' inhospitable behavior towards native peoples in their colonial activities. This idea of cosmopolitan right and hospitality forms the focus on my academic work in political theory, where I concentrate on global justice, indigenous peoples, and historical injustice.

I reserved the address "cosmopolitanright.blogspot.com" years ago, but never got around to blogging on it, mostly due to an actual dissertation on Kant's Cosmopolitan Right. Based on my work in my dissertation, I've published an article about cosmopolitan right and indigenous peoples, in the new journal Public Reason.

Now that I'm in a postdoctoral research position at Queen's University in Ontario, I thought I'd actually blog to help collect my thoughts for writing further articles. I was inspired by Gary Banham's blog about Kant and international relations. I'll probably be discussing Kant in great detail, but also a variety of other topics in political theory and politics more generally (or really, whatever grabs my interest).